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Why are Trade Agreements Regional?
Summary
This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in
which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition
formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar
problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of
many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, and
through strategic interaction in tariff setting, regional trade agreements generate larger
rent-shifting effects than non regional agreements, which countries use to coordinate on
a unique equilibrium. Under naive best responses, regional agreements give way to free
trade.
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1. Introduction
Why do countries seek trade agreements (TAs) that are regional?2 Prominent examples
of TAs where members share common borders are the European Union (EU), the Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR) and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). It is well recognized that the ‘pure’ economic gains through trade creation from
TAs are likely to be higher within regions than between them; see Wonnacott and Lutz
(1989), Krugman (1991), and Summers (1991). And recent econometric work shows that
(the inverse of) distance is a good predictor of TA membership; see Baier and Bergstrand
(2004). Nevertheless, while the past literature shows that the expected gains to a regional
agreement are higher than to a non-regional agreement, and that non-regional agreements
may even be trade diverting, no attempt has been made before to provide a theory of how
regional TAs might actually form.
This paper argues that there is a coordination problem at the heart of the TA formation
process, and countries seek regional TAs as a way to solve that problem. There is undoubtedly signiﬁcant ‘pre-play communication’ between policy-makers before a TA is formed. This
point is used in the past literature to set aside problems of coordination. But in fact, the
need for pre-play communication actually implies that there is a coordination problem to be
resolved as part of that process. By setting the issue aside, the past literature suppresses
a potentially signiﬁcant explanation for why regionalism is a feature of the TA formation
process. The main point brought to light in this paper, by setting the issue of coordination
centre stage, is that countries can use geographical organization to solve their coordination
problem. Thus, each country seeks other countries in its region, and only countries in its
region, when forming a TA.3
2

TA is a ‘catch all’ term that refers to all agreements in which a group of countries commit to trade
among members preferentially. This encompasses free trade agreements (FTAs) in which members agree
to remove internal tariﬀ barriers but set external tariﬀs independently, and customs unions (CUs) which
are like FTAs but with the additional requirement that members coordinate on common external tariﬀs.
In practice, FTAs are more common but most of the academic literature focuses on CUs because they are
analytically easier to handle. To focus the discussion on the regional nature of these agreements rather than
the technical details of their operation, we will use the catch-all term TA wherever possible.
3
There is a literature that looks at the feasibility of multilateral trade agreements when countries cannot
write binding contracts over tariﬀs; see for example Bagwell and Staiger, (1997a,b), (1999), Bond and
Syropoulos (1996), Bond (2001), Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001) and Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos
(2004). All of these previous papers look at how agreements between suﬃciently patient countries may be
sustained through repeated interactions in the face of a short-run incentive to deviate. In the model of
this present paper, there is no short-run incentive to deviate. The problem focused on instead is whether a
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The model is based on Brander and Spencer (1984) and Yi (1996). Brander and Spencer
(1984) show, in a two-country model, that rents made by foreign ﬁrms in the domestic market
can be shifted back home by the government using tariﬀs. Yi (1996) uses a Brander-Spencer
type model to show that a group of countries may obtain a higher payoﬀ from TA formation
than from moving to free trade. The present paper takes a special case of Yi’s model and
extends it by putting it in a regional setting.4
A new eﬀect is revealed when a regional dimension is introduced to the model. One of
Yi’s key results (his Proposition 8) shows that a country would always prefer to leave its own
TA in order to join another TA of equal or larger size, since the new TA that forms is larger.
While fully acknowledging its importance we will show, in Proposition 5 of this present
paper, that Yi’s result is overturned in a regional setting. Without an agreement, since more
rents are dissipated through transportation between regions than within them, there is more
scope for rent-shifting within a region than across regions. TA formation within a region
eliminates this greater harmful rent shifting among members, and in addition has greater
beneﬁcial terms-of-trade eﬀects. Therefore, the value to a member of joining a regional TA
of a given size is greater than the value of a TA across regions. This eﬀect tends to push the
countries of a region towards the formation of a regional TA.
To get a better understanding of the intuition behind this result, consider the original
proposals made in the 1960s for NAFTA - the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement between Canada, the UK and the US. Interpreted within the context of the present model,
Canada and the US would have liked the UK to form a TA with them, but the UK ultimately
obtained a higher payoﬀ from the formation of an agreement with nearby EU nations. This
was so because the gains to elimination of rent shifting within Europe and the terms-of-trade
gains over North America were of greater value to the UK.5
country is able to form an agreement with the other countries that it would like to have as members - the
problem of coordination.
4
Yi’s (1996) compares how ‘open regionalism,’ can help with the attainment of free trade compared to
the outcome under ‘exclusive regionalism’ in which TA membership must be unanimous. While the present
paper draws on Yi’s analysis of exclusive regionalism, it does not address the question of whether open
regionalism would be beneﬁcial in a regional setting. Yi (1996) examines the stable equilibrium structure of
TAs; an approach pioneered by Riezman (1985), that will be extended to a regional setting in the present
paper.
5
The underlying intuition is robust to the fact that the NAFTA proposals were obviously for an FTA
while the EU is a CU. In a broader setting, the choice of trading arrangement may have a signiﬁcant bearing
on the outcome. This point is made by Riezman (1999), who endogenizes the decision by countries over
whether to adopt a CU or FTA, showing that the choice of regime may aﬀect whether free trade can be
reached. (Also see Bloch’s 2003 discussion of CUs versus FTAs, and Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos 2004.)
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The problem of coordination has attracted signiﬁcant attention in the abstract literature
on coalition formation, from which it is widely understood that many equilibria can arise
through the inability to coordinate or commit (see Bloch 2003 and Yi 2003 for reviews).
To introduce the problem of coordination failure in the present context, TA formation is
modelled based on Hart and Kurz’s (1983) simultaneous move exclusive membership game.
In their original game, simultaneously and without communicating, each player writes down
a list of other players with whom he would like to form a coalition. The lists form intersecting
sets of players and each of the intersecting sets forms a coalition. But if two players fail to
name each other then neither ends up in the same coalition even if it would be mutually
beneﬁcial.
In the model of this present paper, each country writes down a list of others with whom
it would like to form a TA. When transport costs between all countries are zero, so in
eﬀect there is no regional dimension to the model, the problem of coordination failure arises
between them. Any one of many possible TAs may arise in equilibrium. On the other hand,
when transport costs of trading between regions are relatively large (but not large enough
to prohibit trade between regions) countries use the diﬀerence in rent-shifting eﬀects within
and between regions to coordinate on regional TA formation. TAs form simultaneously, one
in each region, and each TA includes all countries in that region. This is the sense in which
the coordination problem is resolved when a regional dimension is introduced to the model.6
A key concern about the implications of regionalism is whether or not it is consistent with
the gradual attainment of eﬃciency; ‘whether trade blocks are stepping blocks or stumbling
blocks in the path to free trade’ (Bhagwati 1993; this issue ﬁnds its roots in Viner 1950 and
Lipsey 1960). The insights gained about regional TA formation from the model developed
in the present paper may be helpful to this debate, because they show the limits to the
conclusions of earlier research on this topic. An implication of Yi’s Proposition 8 is that an
equilibrium TA structure must be asymmetric. Countries use the advantage in the sequence
of TA formation that they are exogenously granted to form a larger TA. The countries in
the larger TA are better oﬀ even than under free trade because they enjoy more favorable
6

It would be desirable to have an intermediate step in the analysis wherein the regional dimension is
introduced to the model but the game of coalition formation is the same as used by Yi (1996), namely,
Bloch’s (1996) size announcement game. Unfortunately, this is not possible since Bloch’s size announcement
game does not guarantee existence of an equilibrium once asymmetry is introduced. See the discussion at
the end of Section 2.5, after Proposition 6, for further discussion.
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terms-of-trade eﬀects over non-member countries. As a result, trade blocks are stumbling
blocks in the path to free trade. In the present paper, no such advantages arise due to the
fact that TA formation is simultaneous and because each country is uncertain about the
outcome of the TA formation process. As a result TA formation can be symmetric, with no
larger TA arising that would prefer the status quo to free trade. In that case regional TAs
do ultimately facilitate free trade.7
It might seem disturbing that the discussion has not focused more on traditional Vinerian notions of trade creation and trade diversion when motivating regional trade agreements.
However, Krishna (2003) shows that the traditional Vinerian trade-creation-trade-diversion
calculus does not seem to justify regionalism. It therefore seems fair to look for motivation
based in the more recent trade literature on increasing returns to scale in order to motivate
the formation of TAs that are regional. Also, the model is highly stylized, particularly in
terms of its regional structure. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the results are
only suggestive. Clearly, the next step is to move towards more sophisticated and realistic
underlying models of the world economy of the kind developed by Whalley (1985). Nevertheless, even though the policy analysis is based around Cournot competition, and strong
assumptions are made about functional forms, the results seem intuitively plausible, and
may be indicative of a general driving force towards regionalism for which there appears to
be substantial evidence.8
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic trade model and uses it
to explore the economic eﬀects of TA formation in regions. Section 3 introduces the TA
formation game. Section 4 shows that, in the TA formation game, when transport costs are
zero there are multiple equilibria and no predictions can be made as to which will prevail.
Section 5 shows that when transport costs are positive, this provides a mechanism through
which countries are able to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which regional TAs form.
7

The literature on the dynamic path of trade liberalization examines the possibility that TA formation
gives way to world free trade at a later stage. In addition to Riezman (1999) see Aghion, Antras and Helpman
(2004), Ornelas (2005) and Seidmann (2006) for recent contributions. Building on Baldwin (1996), Krishna
(1998) shows how political interests can undermine the progression from regionalism to multilateralism.
Ethier (1998a, b) considers how multilateral liberalization may give way to regionalism. See Bagwell and
Staiger (1998) on how TAs undermine the principles by which multilateral trade liberalization is achieved.
Also, see Bagwati, Greenaway and Panagariya (1998) for a recent literature review on the dynamics of
regionalism.
8
The same underlying motivation towards regionalism as identiﬁed in this paper is demonstrated in a
quite diﬀerent framework (and for quite diﬀerent purposes) by Egger and Larch (2006). See the discussion
after Proposition 5 for further details.
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Section 6 then examines the extent to which regional TA formation may subsequently give
way to free trade. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.

2. A Model of Trade Agreements in Regions
We will work with a familiar model of international trade based on Cournot competition.
Let N be the set of countries. Each country has a representative consumer, ﬁrm, and
government, each denoted by its corresponding country identiﬁer as i ∈ N.
There are six countries; N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. This is diﬀerent from a standard TA
formation model, which would typically have just three countries. A three-country framework
is the simplest possible framework in which TA formation can be examined, since a minimum
of two countries are required to form a TA and at least one country must remain outside
so that the eﬀects on a non-member can be analyzed. But to extend this simple basic
approach to a regional setting requires a set-up based on two regions, each of which has
three countries. So in our model, there is a regional structure that partitions N into two
regions; R1 = {1, 2, 3} and R2 = {4, 5, 6}.
Regions are some distance apart from one another. Let dij measure the distance between
any two countries i, j ∈ N. Again, to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will say
that if countries i and j are not in the same region then dij = d while if i and j are in the
same region then dij = 0.
So that we can examine whether TA formation evolves towards free trade, we will make
the model of TA formation dynamic with three periods. Within a period, the sequence of
events is as follows. First, TA formation takes place. Next, taking trading arrangements as
given, ﬁrms make production decisions. Finally, consumption takes place. We will adopt the
usual inductive approach of solving this sequence backwards.
2.1. Preferences and Production
There are two goods in the model, denoted M and X. Good M is chosen as the numeraire.
Countries are endowed with equal quantities of M, which is transferred internationally to
settle the balance of trade. By assumption, each country is endowed with a suﬃcient quantity
of M to ensure that it consumes a positive quantity in equilibrium. The term Mi measures
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007
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consumption of M in country i.9
All the ﬁrms in the model, one in each country, produce the homogeneous product X.
We will use xij to denote the quantity produced by the ﬁrm in country j for the market in
country i, and Xi as the quantity produced by all ﬁrms for sale in country i:
Xi =



xij .

(2.1)

j∈N

Consumer preferences are approximated by the following quasi-linear function:
1
ui = v(Xi ) + Mi = eXi − Xi2 + Mi ,
2

(2.2)

where e is a parameter. This functional form is relatively simple, focusing attention on the
impact of product diﬀerentiation by distance.10
The inverse demand curve of consumer i is obtained in the usual way by diﬀerentiating
(2.2) with respect to xij :
pi (Xi ) =

dv
= e − Xi .
dxij

(2.3)

Firm j’s (marginal) cost to produce a unit of X for sale in country i consists of three
components: a private per unit cost, c, which is the same for all ﬁrms; the tariﬀ levied by
government i on imports from j, tij ; the transport cost of shipping from j to i, captured
simply by dij . Thus, ﬁrm j’s per-unit production cost for each market i is given by the
function
cij = c + tij + dij .

(2.4)

We will assume that ﬁrms perceive markets as being segmented, and so they compete by
choosing quantities in each country.11 Firm j chooses xij to maximize proﬁts in each market
9

Note that since all countries are endowed with M and produce X, there is no scope in the present model
for trade diversion. That is, TA formation cannot lower welfare by inducing countries to import more from
TA partners that do not have a comparative advantage. In the present setting, the gains and losses to TA
formation are driven instead by strategic considerations; this is a common feature of the recent literature.
In the conclusions we will discuss how it might be possible to extend the insights of the present model to a
Heckscher-Ohlin setting in which it is possible also to consider trade diversion.
10
This function for preferences is also used by Ornelas (2005). Yi (1996) has a more general form of this
preference function which allows X to be horizontally diﬀerentiated. The model of this present paper could
be extended in that direction but this would complicate the analysis considerably and would risk obscuring
the eﬀects resulting from the organization of countries into regions.
11
This assumption is made for analytical simplicity, but approximates the weaker assumption that ﬁrms
compete over capacities.
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i, denoted π ij :
Max π ij = (pi − cij ) xij ,
{xij }

(2.5)

where pi is determined according to the inverse demand curve pi (Xi ) given by (2.3).
Setting the ﬁrst derivative of (2.5) equal to zero obtains the ﬁrst order condition for
ﬁrm j. Summing ﬁrst order conditions over all j ∈ N, in Cournot equilibrium,12


(e − c) + k∈N dik + k∈N tik
− dij − tij .
xij =
7

(2.6)

Output by ﬁrm j for market i depends negatively on dij and tij ; the smaller the distance
to market, and the lower the tariﬀ, the larger the rents available from shipping to country i
and so the higher the quantity produced. In contrast, output by ﬁrm j depends positively
on the distance from country i to all other markets and the tariﬀ set by country i on imports
from all countries other than j. Note that the strength of demand relative to cost helps to
determine the rents available to ﬁrm j as well; e − c is common to all markets and can be
made large enough to ensure that xij > 0 for all i, j.
2.2. Welfare
Proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms and tariﬀ revenues are rebated back to consumers. Also, there is
perfect competition in the world market for transportation. Based on these assumptions and
the model set-up, country i’s welfare can be expressed in terms of four economic components:
domestic consumer surplus, Ci ; the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt at home and abroad, πii and

j∈N \i π ji respectively (j = i)); tariﬀ revenue, Ti ; shipping revenue, Di . Country i’s welfare
is denoted wi :
wi = Ci + π ii +
where Ci =

1
2

(e − pi ) Xi , Ti =



j∈N tij xij



π ji + Ti + Di ,

(2.7)

j∈N \i

and π ij = (xij )2 . Because the transport sector

is perfectly competitive, goods are delivered at cost and there is no surplus associated with
that sector; Di = 0.13
12
13

This is ﬁrm j’s reaction function for market i.
This speciﬁcation makes ‘iceberg’ transportation costs consistent with a general equilibrium setting.
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2.3. The Structure and Tariﬀs of Trade Agreements
If a group of countries forms a TA, they abolish mutual tariﬀs and jointly choose their
external tariﬀs to maximize the aggregate welfare of members. There are no side-payments
among members, so each country in a TA keeps its own tariﬀ revenue.
Two remarks are in order. First, this is exactly the approach taken in the previous
literature to formalize CU formation. But a key additional requirement of a CU is that all
members set common external tariﬀs. In the previous literature, the approach stated here
does induce members to form a CU, setting a common external tariﬀ, because all countries
are ex ante symmetrical. In the present setting, countries are asymmetrical because we have
introduced a regional structure to the model. So the approach does not necessarily induce
all members to set a common external tariﬀ. In this sense the stipulations of TA formation
are in fact weaker than the requirement that countries form a CU. Countries may choose to
form a CU, but this outcome would be a feature of the equilibrium rather than a rule of TA
formation.
Second, there is nothing in our formalization to stop members from raising their external
tariﬀs when they form a TA. This could put TA formation in violation of Article XXIV of
the GATT, adopted in the Charter of the WTO (GATT 1994), which requires that levels of
protectionism against non-members be no higher (on average) than prior to the agreement.
(Our formalization does satisfy the other key requirement of Article XXIV, that tariﬀs among
members be abolished.) However, since the approach we will take here has been adopted in
past research, its adoption here facilitates comparison with results in the literature.14
2.3.1. Trade Agreement Structure
The structure of TAs in the world economy is deﬁned as follows. A TA structure B =
(B1 , B2 , ..., Bm ) is a partition of the set of countries N, where B1 , B2 , ... , Bm are TAs;
Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for i = j, and ∪m
i=1 Bi = N. If Bi has only one element then it is referred to as a
singleton; a country that does not coordinate trade policy with others and simply optimizes
14

Mrazova, Vines and Zissimos (2006) show in a related model that imposing an ‘Article XXIV constraint,’
which prevents members from raising common external tariﬀs, does not dramatically alter the structure of
the TAs that form in equilibrium.
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tariﬀs on a unilateral basis.15
Recall that the location of each country is ﬁxed either in R1 or in R2 . Therefore,
(Bk ∩ R1 ) ∪ (Bk ∩ R2 ) = Bk . Let bir be the number of country i’s TA partners that are
in the same region as country i, and let binr be the number of country i’s TA partners
that are in the “other” region.16 In the present simple regional set-up, bir ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
binr ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
2.3.2. Optimal tariﬀs
The members of a TA coordinate on setting external tariﬀs exactly as they would in a CU:
⎛
⎞



⎝Ci + π ii +
wi =
πji + Ti + Di ⎠ ,
(2.8)
Max
{tij }i∈B

/ k
k ,j ∈B

i∈Bk

j∈N \i

i∈Bk

where tij = 0 for all i, j ∈ Bk .
We now determine optimal tariﬀs; let r stand for regional and nr stands for non-regional.
Then tir is the tariﬀ that country i sets on imports from non-members in the same region
and tinr is the tariﬀ set on imports from non-members in the other region. The following
notation will be helpful with writing down the optimal tariﬀ:
Δ (bir , binr ) ≡ 7 + (1 + (bir + bnr )) (3 + 2 (bir + binr )) .
Optimal tariﬀs are derived in the next result.
Proposition 1. Assume that country i belongs to a TA of bir regional members and
binr non-regional members. Country i’s unique optimal external tariﬀ on imports from a
non-member in the same region as country i is
t∗ir (bir , binr ; d) =

(1 + 2 (bir + binr )) (e − c)
Δ (bir , binr )
3 + 6bir + binr (2 (bir + binr ) − 7)
+
d.
2Δ (bir , binr )

15

In coalition formation, relations between countries are transitive; if Countries 1 and 2 have an agreement
and 2 and 3 have an agreement then 1 and 3 must have an agreement. In network formation, by contrast,
relations may be intransitive; it does not follow that 1 and 3 must have an agreement. Because TA formation
involves coordination over external and internal tariﬀs, it implies a transitive relationship between members.
Almost all the literature on stable equilibrium TA structures focuses on transitive trade agreements, as we
do here. Goyal and Joshi (2005) is one exception, in which FTAs are modelled as a network.
16
Formally, if i ∈ Bk and i ∈ Rl then let bir be the cardinality of the set Bk ∩ Rl and let binr be the
cardinality of the set Bk ∩ Rm , l = m.
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The unique optimal external tariﬀ imposed by country i on non-members who are not
in the same region as country i is
t∗inr (bir , binr ; d) =

(1 + 2 (bir + binr )) (e − c)
Δ (bir , binr )
5 + bir (2bir − 3) + 2binr (5 + bir )
d.
−
2Δ (bir , binr )

The most important thing to notice about t∗ir (bir , binr ; d) and t∗inr (bir , binr ; d) is that the
diﬀerence between them depends on d. That is, if d = 0 then t∗ir (bir , binr ; d) = t∗inr (bir , binr ; d).
And t∗ir (bir , binr ; d) − t∗inr (bir , binr ; d) is increasing in d > 0. Also notice that if d = 0 then
t∗ir = t∗inr corresponds exactly to the optimal tariﬀ found in previous literature.17
2.4. Demand functions by region and TA membership
We can now write down expressions for equilibrium output produced by country j for country
i along two dimensions; whether or not country j is a member of country i’s TA and whether
or not country j is in the same region as country i. These expressions are obtained from (2.6)
by appropriate substitution of distance dij = 0 or dij = d and optimal tariﬀs t∗ir (bir , binr ; d)
and t∗inr (bir , binr ; d).18
Let m stand for TA member and let nm stand for non-member. Write xirm for output
produced for country i by a country that is in the same region as country i and is a member
of country i’s TA:
xirm (bir , binr ; d) =

2 (1 + bir + binr ) (e − c) + (3 (1 + bir ) + 2binr ((bir + binr − 1))) d
. (2.9)
Δ (bir , binr )

Write xinrm for output produced for country i by a country not in the same region but
which is a member of country i’s TA:
xinrm (bir , binr ; d) =

2 (1 + bir + binr ) (e − c) − (5 + 2b2ir + binr (5 + 2bir )) d
.
Δ (bir , binr )

(2.10)

17

Under a particular speciﬁcation, Yi’s preference function replicates the expression for ui in the present
paper, (2.2). In the model of the present paper, if we let d = 0 and k = bir + binr then t∗ir = t∗inr =
(1 + 2k) (e − c) / 8 + 3k + 2k 2 . If we set n = 6 in Yi’s expression for the optimal tariﬀ, presented in his
Proposition 1, we obtain τ (k) = (1 + 2k) / 8 + 3k + 2k 2 , where τ (k) is Yi’s notation for the optimal tariﬀ.
Note that Yi assumes e − c = 1 (expressed in our notation).
18
The intermediate step of solving for equilibrium output based on the model’s regional structure but for
arbitrary tariﬀs is presented in the appendix.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper127

10

12

Zissimos: Why are Trade Agreements Regional?

Write xirnm for output produced for country i by a country that is in the same region
but not a member of country i’s TA:

xirnm (bir , binr ; d) =

2 (e − c) + (3 + binr (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d
.
2Δ (bir , binr )

(2.11)

Finally, write xinrnm for output produced for country i by a country that is not in the same
region and is not a of country i’s TA:
xinrnm (bir , binr ; d) =

2 (e − c) − (5 + bir (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d
.
2Δ (bir , binr )

(2.12)

From these expressions, total output is given by
Xi = bir xirm + (3 − bir ) xirnm + binr xinrm + (3 − binr )xinrnm .
2.5. TA Expansion and Welfare
In this subsection, we shall examine the eﬀect on welfare of TA formation and expansion. We
will want to focus on a situation where TA formation does not lead to a complete severing
of trade relations, since otherwise the eﬀects are rather obvious. So we will derive conditions
under which we can restrict attention to a situation where ﬁrms in all countries produce
positive quantities for all markets. Output levels and hence trade ﬂows are positive even
between countries that are in diﬀerent regions and not members of the same TA.
It can be seen by inspection that trade ﬂows are lowest between countries that are not
members of the same TA and are not in the same region; xinrnm (bir , binr ) is the smallest of
the quantities given by (2.9)-(2.12).19 Also, by (2.12), xinrnm (bir , binr ) is decreasing in d. It
follows that placing an upper bound on d ensures that xinrnm (bir , binr ) > 0 and that in turn
all trade ﬂows are positive. The next result identiﬁes the upper bound on d.20
Lemma 1. Fix e > c. If d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22) then, for bir ∈ {1, 2, 3}, binr ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and
bir +binr ≤ 5 we have that xirm (bir , binr ) > xinrm (bir , binr ) > xirnm (bir , binr ) > xinrnm (bir , binr ) >
0 and t∗ir (bir , binr ) > t∗inr (bir , binr ) > 0.
19

Henceforth, the parameter d will be dropped from functional notation so that, for example, tir (bir , binr ; d)
will be written tir (bir , binr ) and xinrnm (bir , binr ; d) will be written xinrnm (bir , binr ).
20
The reason for restricting attention to bir + binr = 5 in the result is because there are no non-regional
non-members under free trade (bir = 3, binr = 3), and so it does not make sense to calculate a quantity for
xinrnm (3, 3).
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To restrict attention to positive output levels and positive optimal tariﬀs, the following
standing assumption will be imposed throughout.
Assumption 1. d ∈ [0, (e − c) /22).
Thus, TA formation always entails the removal of positive tariﬀs.
We now turn to look at the eﬀect of TA formation on member and non-member welfare.
We will follow Yi (1996) by looking ﬁrst at the eﬀect of TA formation on non-member
countries. Yi shows (in his Proposition 3) that if a TA forms or expands, then non-member
countries are adversely aﬀected. We will now show that Yi’s result extends directly to the
present model.
TA expansion may occur within a region (in which case bir increases) or across regions
(in which case binr increases). Thus, deﬁne TA expansion as an increase in bir and/or binr .21
TA formation is just a special case of TA expansion in which all members of the TA that
forms start as singletons.
Also note that TA expansion only aﬀects non-members through the demand for exports.
This is because optimal tariﬀ setting of non-members is unaﬀected by TA formation. Thus
we can evaluate the eﬀect of TA formation on non-members entirely in terms of the eﬀect
on non-member exports to the TA, xirnm and xinrnm , and hence export proﬁts. The next
result shows that both xirnm and xinrnm are globally decreasing in bir and binr .
Proposition 2. For bir ∈ {1, 2, 3}, binr ∈ {0, 1, 2}, it is the case that dxirnm /dbir < 0,
dxinrnm /dbir < 0, dxirnm /dbinr < 0, dxinrnm /dbinr < 0. A non-member country’s volume of
exports and export proﬁts to a TA of size bir , binr is decreasing in bir and decreasing in binr .
The expansion or formation of a TA reduces the welfare of non-member countries.
As a TA expands, and removes internal trade barriers, demand for X by consumers
in member countries turns towards TA members and away from non-members, hurting the
export proﬁts of non-members.
Let us now examine the eﬀect of TA formation on the welfare of members. Yi shows for
21

Say that a TA initially has two members, one in each region. Then say that one member breaks up with
its partner and instead forms a TA with two countries from its own region. Although a new larger TA is
created, this is not allowable under our deﬁnition of TA expansion since it involves cessation/contraction of
membership of the initial TA.
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his model that the joint welfare of countries involved in TA expansion increases (where ‘joint’
implies the welfare of existing members and new members). And more generally, if several
TAs merge to form a larger TA the aggregate welfare of the member countries increases.
Yi remarks that consumer surplus displays a non-monotonicity that is present in underlying
optimal external tariﬀs; the consumer surplus in member countries may ﬁrst decrease and
then increases as a TA expands. A country’s export proﬁts, on the other hand, may initially
increase but ultimately decreases as the TA expands. The present model introduces a further
ambiguity because there are two common external tariﬀs; the one levied on countries in the
same region and the one levied on countries in the other region.
Even though the economic environment is made more complicated by the regional dimension of the model, the next result shows that Yi’s Proposition 4 extends to the present
setting as well.
Proposition 3. The expansion or formation of a TA increases the aggregate welfare of
member countries.
Despite the levying of diﬀerent external tariﬀs across regions, the same logic that underpins Yi’s Proposition 4 may be applied here too. If a set of countries abolishes tariﬀs
internally and sets external tariﬀs to maximize aggregate welfare then their joint welfare
must improve. Proposition 3 shows that the formation of a TA improves joint welfare of
member countries even if non-negative tariﬀs on imports are the only policy tools and even
though members and non-members may be in diﬀerent regions.
So far, we have seen that Yi’s results concerning TA expansion in an environment where
all countries are ex ante symmetric extend to the present setting where countries are ex ante
asymmetric. When a TA expands, this increases the aggregate welfare of the countries in
the TA and harms countries that are not members of the TA. Just as in the world where
countries are ex ante symmetric, this implies that the eﬀect of TA expansion on global
welfare is ambiguous. The single case in which this ambiguity disappears is the case where
TA expansion goes all the way to the grand coalition, which is equivalent to world free
trade. Thus, Yi’s Proposition 5 carries over to the present setting and is reproduced here
for completeness.
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Proposition 4. The eﬀects on global welfare of the formation or expansion of TAs are
ambiguous, except when the grand TA forms. World welfare is higher under the grand TA
(world free trade) than under any other TA structure.
All of Yi’s results that we have examined so far extend to the present setting. These
results have focused on the welfare eﬀects of TA expansion on non-members and on the
aggregate welfare of members.
Let us now focus explicitly on the welfare of individual member countries in the TA
formation process. In doing so, we will show that a key property of Yi’s homogeneouscountry model fails to hold when transport costs are suﬃciently large but still in the range
where trade ﬂows between all countries are positive. Of course, Yi’s result continues to hold
when transport costs are suﬃciently small.22
Proposition 5. There exists a unique value d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22) such that for d ∈ [0, d ),
a country is better oﬀ in a (4-country) TA consisting of itself and all 3 countries in the
other region than in a (3-country) regional TA in its own region. For d ∈ [d , (e − c) /22), a
country is better oﬀ in a (3-country) regional TA in its own region than in a (4-country) TA
consisting of itself and all 3 countries in the other region.
For d ∈ [0, d ) this result is consistent with Yi’s Proposition 8, which says that a member
of a TA becomes better oﬀ if it leaves its TA to join another TA of equal or larger size. But
for d ∈ [d , (e − c) /22), the result says that a country is better oﬀ remaining in a 3-country
TA within its own region than it would be if it left its regional TA to form a 4-country TA
with all three countries in the other region.
To understand the intuition behind this result, let us consider a member of a regional
TA (in its own region), and ask whether it could gain by joining a regional TA in the other
region. Say that Country 1 is initially in a regional TA; 1 ∈ B1 = R1 . And say that the
countries in the other region form another regional TA, B2 = R2 . Country 1 considers
whether it could gain by leaving B1 and joining B2 . Decompose the process into three steps:
(i) Original members of B2 abolish tariﬀs on imports from Country 1 and change tariﬀs
on the other countries in R1 from t∗inr (3, 0) to t∗inr (3, 1); (ii) Country 1 abolishes tariﬀs on
22

We will assume that if a country is just indiﬀerent between forming a regional agreement or a nonregional agreement then it exhibits a preference for the regional agreement. This assumption is trivial, and
could be reversed without consequence.
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all countries in B2 , and levies tariﬀs at t∗ir (1, 3) on its two former TA partners in B1 ; (iii)
The remaining two members of B1 change tariﬀs on the (original) members of B2 (who are
located in R2 ) from t∗inr (3, 0) to t∗inr (2, 0) and levy a tariﬀ t∗ir (2, 0) on Country 1.
Consider the eﬀect of each of these steps on the welfare of Country 1 for d ∈ [0, d) and
d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22] respectively. Take d ∈ [0, d ) ﬁrst. (i) The abolition of tariﬀs by the
members of B2 has a positive impact on the welfare of Country 1, because Country 1 enjoys
greater openness in three markets. (ii) Country 1’s abolition of tariﬀs on all three countries
in B2 also improves welfare but the implementation of tariﬀs on its two former TA partners
in B1 reduces welfare; the net eﬀect is positive because access is increased to three markets
while it is reduced in only two. (iii) Finally, the implementation of tariﬀs by its two former
TA partners in B1 reduces export proﬁts and hence welfare in Country 1. But the eﬀect
on exports of access to its three new partners in B2 (in step (i)) more than compensates.
The positive eﬀect on consumer surplus from net tariﬀ removal in moving to the larger TA
is greater than the negative eﬀect on tariﬀ revenue and the loss of domestic proﬁts from
greater competition in the domestic market.
Now take d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22]. The impact on welfare for Country 1 of moving from B1
to B2 is reversed. (i) As before, the removal of tariﬀs by Country 1’s three new partners in
B2 has a positive impact on export proﬁts. (ii) And once again, Country 1’s abolition of
tariﬀs on all three countries in B2 improves welfare while the implementation of tariﬀs on
its two former TA partners in B1 reduces welfare. But in the presence of transport costs,
the net eﬀect is negative because the implementation of tariﬀs by two nearby partners has a
larger negative eﬀect on export proﬁts than the removal of tariﬀs by the three new distant
partners in the other region. (iii) Again, the implementation of tariﬀs by its two former TA
partners in B1 reduces export proﬁts and hence welfare in Country 1. And now, the eﬀect on
exports of access to its three new partners in B2 (in step (i)) is not suﬃcient to compensate.
The positive eﬀect on consumer surplus from net tariﬀ removal in moving to the larger TA
is smaller than the negative eﬀect on tariﬀ revenue and the loss of domestic proﬁts from
greater competition in the domestic market.
Thus, a key result of Yi’s is overturned in the present model with the introduction of
transport costs. This is signiﬁcant because it shows that a country will not leave a TA in its
own region to form or join a TA in the other region, even if the new TA that forms is larger.
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In Yi’s characterization of an equilibrium TA structure, the ﬁrst TA to form is the largest.
Our result calls into question whether, in a regional setting, a country would always agree
to join a larger TA.
One is bound to ask whether the tendency towards regionalism presented in this result
is speciﬁc to the model we are using here. Interestingly, Egger and Larch (2006) show that
exactly the same eﬀect prevails in a generalization of Krugman’s (1991) constant-elasticityof-substitution model of regionalism. Egger and Larch (2006) have three regions, each of
which has two countries. They present simulations in Figure 4 of their paper to show that,
with relatively high intercontinental transport costs, a country would rather form a (two
country) regional TA than form a (three country) TA by joining a TA with two countries
from another region. This suggests that the tendencies towards regionalism derived in the
present model extend to other settings as well.23
A natural question to ask next is whether the members of a regional TA would invite
a country from the other region to join them. The next result shows that, once again, the
answer depends on the size of transport costs.
Proposition 6. There exists a value d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22) such that for d ∈ [0, d) the
highest feasible level of welfare is achieved when a country is a member of a TA with all of
its regional partners and one country from the other region while non-members are singletons.
For d ∈ [d , (e − c) /22), the highest feasible level of welfare is achieved when a country is
a member of a regional TA (with all members from its own regional and no members from
the other region) while non-members are singletons.
This result is again in keeping with Yi (1996). A group of countries can obtain a
higher level of welfare than under free trade by forming a TA while non-members remain as
singletons. In Yi’s model, the highest level of welfare is achieved by a country when it forms
a TA of four members. This continues to be true in our model for d ∈ [0, d), i.e. when
transport costs are small. When transport costs are larger, that is d ∈ [d , (e − c) /22), a
country does better by forming a regional TA (only with members from its own region). The
reason is that the terms-of-trade beneﬁts of TA formation increase with transport costs, and
these beneﬁts are increasing in the number of countries left outside the TA. In either case,
23

Egger and Larch (2006) identify these eﬀects to make sense of their empirical investigation of tendencies
towards regional TAs.
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to maximize national welfare, the TA of which a country is a member must include all of its
regional partners.
We are now in a position to see that existence of equilibrium would not have been
guaranteed in our model if we had adopted the Bloch (1996) ‘size announcement’ game
(used by Yi 1996) as our game of TA formation. The application of that game to the present
framework would be the following. All countries are placed on a list, say 1, 2, ... , 6. Country
1 would be asked to announce the size of the agreement that it would like to form. Then,
all proposed partners (following subsequently from Country 1) would be asked to agree or
disagree. If a proposed partner disagrees then it is asked to make its own proposal of a TA
and, again, each subsequent proposed partner is asked whether or not it agrees. If all agree
then those countries withdraw from the game, and the next country on the list is asked to
announce the size of the TA that it wants to form. If the end of the list of countries is
reached then there is a return to the ﬁrst country on the list that has not already formed an
agreement and withdrawn from the game.
Now consider what would happen if the size announcement game were played based
on our model for d ∈ (d , d). In that case since d ∈ (0, d), by Proposition 6, Country 1
would announce that it wants to form a 4-country TA consisting of itself and Countries 2,
3 and 4. But since d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22], by Proposition 5, Country 4 would do better in its
own regional TA so it refuses (while Countries 2 and 3 accept). When Country 4 is asked
to make an alternative proposal, by Proposition 6, it proposes a TA consisting of itself and
Countries 5, 6 and 1. This is a mirror of Country 1’s original proposal. It is now clear that
no equilibrium would exist in this situation.24 In addition to providing a way to capture the
coordination problem in TA formation, the TA formation game presented in the next section
also provides a way around this existence problem.

3. The TA Formation Game
As argued in the Introduction, a country has many potential options for partners when
seeking a TA, and this creates potential for coordination failure. We will capture this problem
formally by basing the TA formation process on the δ − coalition formation game of Hart
24

A similar argument establishes that no equilibrium exists for d ∈ [0, d ]. For d ∈ [d , (e − c) /22], an
equilibrium does exist for the size announcement game in which two regional TAs form, one in each region.
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and Kurz (1983). Within that setting, once a country had chosen which potential partners
it would approach to form a TA, a reasonable assumption would be that countries who had
approached each other would have more information about the prospective membership of
their agreement than countries who had not approached each other. In the TA formation
game, we will adopt a particularly tractable form of this assumption; within a period, each
country only knows about the prospective TA membership of its own TA partners. We adopt
this approach from Arnold and Wooders (2005), who impose this essential restriction on the
ﬂow of information in their general formalization of club formation.
The game lasts three periods; t = 0, 1, 2. The process is initialized at t = 0 with a TA
structure in which there are no TAs; initially the TA structure, B, is the set of singletons.
Within each period t ≥ 1, the sequence of events is as follows. At the start of the period,
each country observes the TA structure of the previous period. Then, each country i chooses
a strategy si , where each si contains a list of countries in N with which country i would
like to form a TA; this list includes country i itself. The purpose of including i in si is that
then we can view Bk as the intersecting set of all the elements of strategies si for all i ∈ N.
The strategy space Si for country i is the set of all subsets of N i.e. the set of all possible
TAs that could include country i. Strategies are chosen simultaneously. During the TA
formation process, a country only observes whether or not it ends up in a TA and, if so, it
sees which other countries are its TA partners. A country does not observe the strategies
of other countries. We will say that, during the TA formation process, if a country does
not observe another country as its TA partner, it maintains the assumption that the trade
policy of that other country is described by the TA structure B of the previous period.
A bilateral trade accord (i, j) is formed if and only if i ∈ sj and j ∈ si . A subset of
countries Bk is a TA if and only if all pairs of countries in Bk have a bilateral trade accord.
This assumption ensures that a TA forms if and only if there is unanimous support for
its membership. If a country ﬁnds itself in the position of being in two or more otherwise
exclusive and otherwise unanimous TAs, it chooses the TA that maximizes its payoﬀ under
the assumption that the memberships of the TA it joins and the TA that it leaves remain
otherwise constant.25 When a country chooses one TA over another one, it assumes that the
25

Pushing this one step further, any two countries caught between two TAs will assume that each behaves
in the same way as the other in the TA that they choose. This assumption is the same as that of Hart
and Kurz, that if any player is caught between two coalitions then it chooses the biggest one under the
assumption that all other players caught in the same situation do the same. In a symmetrical world this
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other goes ahead without it. If a new TA forms by the merger of more than one existing
TA, then all members of all merging TAs must agree to the new one.
Under the assumption that countries observe the TA structure given by B in the previous
period and take this as given, it is not possible to break up an existing TA in the process of
forming a new one. Therefore, the assumption introduces a degree of inertia into the formal
characterization of existing TAs. Countries are unable to force out existing TA partners once
a TA has formed. In one sense this is theoretically restrictive, but it reﬂects actual practical
restrictions on the cessation arrangements of existing TAs. For example, with regard to the
EU, any member of the Council of Ministers has the power to veto membership of a country
that would like to join, but there is no way to force out a country that is already a member.
The present formalization reﬂects perfectly this type of arrangement.
Each strategy vector s = (s1 , ..., sN ) induces a unique TA structure, B, and so we can
now write B as a function of s; B (s):
B (s) = { (i, j)| i ∈ sj , j ∈ si } .
Since a TA structure implies a unique value of bir and binr for each country i, and since these
in turn imply values of t∗ir (bir , binr ) and t∗inr (bir , binr ), the payoﬀ to country i associated with
s can be represented simply as wi = wi (tir (B (s)) , tinr (B (s))); the payoﬀ for country i from
the TA structure induced by s. For compactness, we may write wi = wi (s).
The notion of equilibrium is adapted from Arnold and Wooders (2005). For any given
TA structure B = (B1 , ..., Bk , ..., Bm ), a strategy vector s∗ ∈ S is a Nash club equilibrium of
the TA formation game if for any given Bk ∈ B there is no Z ⊆ Bk and s ∈ S such that
/ Z.
1. si = s∗i for all i ∈
2. wi (s) ≥ wi (s∗ ) for all i ∈ Z and wi (s) > wi (s∗ ) for some i ∈ Z.
By deﬁnition, an equilibrium exists if no group of countries Z in some TA, Bk , can do
better by deviating. By contrast, Hart and Kurz allow deviations to be undertaken by any
coalition Z ⊆ N. If we were to allow deviations by any coalition of countries Z ⊆ N, then
equilibrium may fail to exist, for reasons that shall become clear. Our deﬁnition weakens
assumption is innocuous. In principle this assumption could lead to mistakes in an asymmetrical world but
this potential problem will not be an issue for any of the situations that we will study.
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the notion of equilibrium relative to Hart and Kurz, admitting a relatively large number
of equilibria. In particular, it does not exclude from the equilibrium set candidates that
arise as a result of coordination failure - in the present context, where countries could all
beneﬁt from moving to free trade but fail to do so due to the restrictions placed on the ﬂow
of information. It remains to be shown how the problem of coordination arises when all
countries are symmetric and is resolved when a degree of asymmetry is introduced between
countries.

4. The Problem of Coordination Failure
We will now show how the problem of coordination arises in a world where all countries are
symmetrical. To do so, ﬁx d = 0. By Proposition 6, we know that a TA of four countries
maximizes the welfare of its members (if the other two countries are singletons). The problem
of coordination failure arises because, even if each country writes down a strategy si with
four elements, in the absence of communication there are many possible TA structures that
may arise in equilibrium as a result of all countries playing this strategy. An equilibrium may
arise in which there is a TA with four countries, which is the desired outcome of each of the
members. But of course the two countries excluded from the four-country TA do not achieve
their desired outcome. Moreover, this is not the only TA structure that can be sustained in
equilibrium. We will ﬁrst consider an equilibrium in which there is a four-country TA, but
then consider one of many possible alternative TA structures that may arise.
4.1. Various equilibria with coordination failure
An example of a strategy vector that gives rise to an equilibrium in which there is a fourcountry agreement is as follows:
s1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s3 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s4 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s5 = {1, 2, 5, 6}
s6 = {1, 2, 5, 6} .
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Notice that the strategies s1 ...s4 form an intersecting set of elements {1, 2, 3, 4} while 5 is
only listed in s6 (and s5 of course) and 6 is only listed in s5 (and s6 ). Thus, the resulting
trade agreement structure is {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}}. It is easy to check that no country can
gain by deviating from this agreement structure and so therefore this must be an equilibrium. Consider the allowable deviations. If a member of the four-country TA were to veto
membership of another single member then the TA structure would become one of a threecountry TA, a singleton and a two-country TA, for example {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5, 6}}. Then,
by Proposition 6, the payoﬀ to the country that undertook the veto would fall, as would the
payoﬀ of the ejected member. The welfare of 5 and 6 actually increases. If more than one
country’s membership is vetoed, it is easy to check that the payoﬀ of remaining members
falls even further. No member of the four-country TA has an incentive to deviate. The same
is true for the two-country TA. Thus we have a Nash club equilibrium.
We have already discussed above the reasons why the welfare of members to an agreement changes when one or more countries are ejected. Let us brieﬂy review why nonmember welfare changes. We just noted that, from an initial trade agreement structure of
{{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}}, if Country 4 is ejected, leaving a trade agreement structure of {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5, 6}},
then the welfare of 5 and 6 increases. Why does this happen? Tariﬀs set by 5 and 6 do not
change because these depend only on their own trade agreement structure, which has not
changed. When 4 is ejected, Countries 1, 2 and 3 restore tariﬀs against it, and as a result
demand less of X from 4, shifting some of their demand towards 5 and 6. This increases
proﬁts in 5 and 6. In addition, 4 restores tariﬀs against Countries 1, 2 and 3, shifting its
demand for X towards 5 and 6. Both of these eﬀects combine to shift proﬁts towards 5 and
6, thus increasing welfare.
Notice that, because d = 0, the partition of countries into regions has no relevance to
this equilibrium. As speciﬁed, the equilibrium contains three countries from R1 and one
country from R2 . But under an equivalent characterization of equilibrium we could permute
the countries in such a way that two countries were in R1 (say 1 and 2), and two countries
were in R2 (say 3 and 4). This is due to the fact that all countries are symmetrical. We shall
see that the partition of countries into regions does become relevant for equilibrium when
d > 0.
Now let us consider another possible equilibrium, in which there are three agreements,
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each with two members. This equilibrium arises if each country proposes to form a TA with
the three countries ‘next to it’:
s1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s2 = {2, 3, 4, 5}
s3 = {3, 4, 5, 6}
s4 = {4, 5, 6, 1}
s5 = {5, 6, 1, 2}
s6 = {6, 1, 2, 3} .
By inspection of the strategy vector, the agreements that form are {1, 4}, {2, 5} and
{3, 6}. Again, it is straight-forward to check that this is an equilibrium strategy vector.
If any member of a two-country agreement vetoes membership of the other, splitting the
agreement into two singleton agreements, then its payoﬀ falls by Proposition 3. This is
the only feasible deviation. Consequently, the strategy vector shown above must be an
equilibrium. And again, notice that the partition of countries into regions has no relevance
to this equilibrium.

5. Transport Costs and Coordination
The problem of coordination failure identiﬁed in the previous section is resolved in the
presence of transport cost d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22). It follows from Proposition 6 that in period
t = 1 each country has an incentive to form a trade agreement with all other countries in
the same region.
Proposition 7. Assume d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22). At t = 1 there is a unique equilibrium with
two regional TAs; B1 = R1 , B2 = R2 . The payoﬀ to each country is the same and is lower
than free trade.
There are two cases to consider, although the outcome is the same in both; one where
d ∈ (0, d ) and one is where d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22). The second case is easier so we consider
that ﬁrst. Recall that for d = 0 each country wants to be in a TA with four other countries.
For d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22), due to higher transport costs, each country obtains the highest level
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of welfare from a regional TA with only the two other countries in its own region. Thus, it
is immediate that the intersecting sets formed by countries’ strategies is two regional TAs;
B1 = R1 and B2 = R2 .
The case where d ∈ (0, d) is slightly more subtle. In that case, each country’s welfare is
maximized by a 4-member TA with three members from its own region and one member from
the other region. But even if all countries write down a strategy containing four countries,
three from its own region and one from the other region, the intersecting sets of countries
formed by these strategies give rise to two regional TAs; B1 = R1 and B2 = R2 . To see why,
consider the following strategy vector:
s1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s3 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
s4 = {1, 4, 5, 6}
s5 = {1, 4, 5, 6}
s6 = {1, 4, 5, 6} .
The strategies s1 ...s3 form an intersecting set of elements {1, 2, 3} and the strategies s4 ...s6
form an intersecting set of elements {4, 5, 6}. Thus, the resulting trade agreement structure
is {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}}. Even though, for this example, all countries that end up in B1 list
Country 4, Country 4 only names Country 1 and not 2 and 3. Only the membership of 1,
2 and 3 is unanimous among all members. It is straight forward to check that the same is
true for all other possible strategy vectors.
No country can gain by deviating from this agreement structure and so therefore this
must be an equilibrium. Consider the allowable deviations. If a member of one of the regional
agreements were to veto membership of another single member then the agreement structure
would become one of a two-country agreement, a singleton and a three-country agreement;
for example {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5} , {6}}. Then the payoﬀ to the country that undertook the veto,
in this example Country 4 or 5, would fall. The welfare of countries in the regional trade
agreement that remains {1, 2, 3} actually increases. As before, if more than one country’s
membership is vetoed, it is easy to check that the payoﬀ of the remaining member falls even
further. Thus, no member of a regional agreement has an incentive to deviate. No deviation
is available to the singleton. Thus we have a Nash club equilibrium. Providing play proceeds
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in the manner described, this is the only possible equilibrium that can arise for transport
costs in the interval d ∈ (0, (e − c)/22)). In equilibrium the trade agreement structure is
symmetrical, so each country receives the same payoﬀ. By Proposition 4, the payoﬀ that
each country receives must be lower than under free trade.
Clearly, the assumption that agents hold constant the strategies of other countries when
forming a trade agreement is crucial for this outcome. If countries were far-sighted then
each would obviously anticipate that the countries of the other region would form a trade
agreement as well. Then each country would be able to see that a move to free trade would
be more beneﬁcial. But we can also see how the present assumption of naivete captures
aspects of uncertainty that are likely to be present in the actual process of trade agreement
formation across regions.

6. Do Regional TAs Facilitate Free Trade?
We have seen how, for d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22), two regional TAs emerge at stage t = 1. We now
proceed to stage t = 2 and ask whether free trade can emerge at this point. We ﬁnd that it
does. The thinking is as follows. Each country observes the regional trading arrangements
described by B from period t = 1. At t = 1, there are two regional trade agreements;
B1 = R1 , B2 = R2 . At t = 2, countries are able to secure this same payoﬀ as at t = 1 by
maintaining the existing structure. However, each is able to obtain a higher payoﬀ by moving
to free trade. Thus every country is potentially able to gain by moving to free trade. In the
next result, the reference to t = 1 replicates Proposition 1 and is included for completeness.
Proposition 8. Assume d ∈ {0, (e − c) /22}. There is a unique equilibrium path. At t = 1
there are two regional TAs; B1 = R1 , B2 = R2 . At t = 2 there is world free trade.
How can free trade be an equilibrium at t = 2 but not at t = 1? At t = 1 a country has
an incentive to veto the membership of one or more countries in the other region. The payoﬀ
to such a deviation rests on the assumption that all the excluded members return to the
trade agreement structure given by the network B at t = 0. That is, all excluded countries
were assumed to return to singleton status. At t = 2 the outcome is diﬀerent. All excluded
countries are assumed to return to the trade agreement structure given by B at t = 1. By
Proposition 7, the payoﬀ to such a deviation is not proﬁtable as it is lower than free trade.
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Also recall that, by assumption, it is not possible to break apart an existing trade agreement
by ejecting a subset of countries from the other region. If a deviation from free trade were
allowed in which only one of the countries were ejected, for example bringing about a trade
agreement structure of {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , {6}}, then countries 1, 2 and 3 may be able to gain
over free trade. For the same reason, si = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is not an allowable strategy at t = 2,
given the equilibrium {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} at t = 1. Indeed, the only proﬁtable strategy is
free trade, since it includes all the countries from the two agreements of period t = 1. Thus,
we have shown that free trade is a Nash club equilibrium at t = 2. Regional trade agreements
do ultimately facilitate free trade.

7. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to show that problems of coordination failure in the
formation of TAs may be resolved when countries are organized into regions. Costs of
shipping goods between regions must be signiﬁcant, but no so high as to eliminate trade
between regions. With no transport costs, there is a problem of multiple equilibria due to
coordination failure familiar from the theory of coalition formation. Positive transport costs
are enough to bring about a unique equilibrium in the ﬁrst period of the TA formation game.
Starting from a situation where there are no TAs, in the ﬁrst period two regional TAs form
simultaneously. In the second period the two regional TAs merge to bring about free trade.
The attainment of free trade only after a period of regionalism rests on a restriction in the
ﬂow of information through the TA formation process. Members can only communicate
about their agreement once they have simultaneously and independently chosen their trade
agreement partners. Best responses are made naively, based only on information about the
TA structure of the previous period.
Inevitably, the theoretical framework developed here simpliﬁes the situation in a number of key respects. The underlying economic structure of the model is one of Cournot
competition in a homogeneous product. In practice, the forces of competition are more
subtle and complex. Future research could take steps to see whether the insights of the
present model extend to alternative settings. It seems reasonable to argue that the features
of the model exhibited in the examples would extend to other forms of competition. It is
widely appreciated that Bertrand competition behaves like Cournot competition when ﬁrms
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must pre-commit to quantities. A more elaborate modelling of perfect competition should
also exhibit the same features, as suggested by Bond (2001). The key motivating feature
of the model is that import substitution elasticities are declining in distance in the model,
and this motivates higher rents in trade and hence higher tariﬀs between close neighbors
in the absence of an agreement. This feature of the model should be robust to alternative
assumptions about competition.
It also seems reasonable to argue that the features of the model would extend to a
more elaborate model of production. A direct way to do this would be to assume that X is
horizontally diﬀerentiated, extending preferences and production accordingly. Alternatively,
Syropoulos (1999) oﬀers a way to investigate whether the insights of the model developed in
the present paper could be extended to a Heckscher-Ohlin framework.
One question that should be addressed in future research on this topic is whether the
model predictions are robust to more elaborate and realistic country and regional structures.
How big must the asymmetries across countries and regions get before problems of multiple
equilibria re-emerge? When will asymmetries preclude the eventual move to free trade?
It would also be desirable to see whether the basic insights of the present model could be
extended to alternative model speciﬁcations.
A focus of recent research on regionalism is on situations where tariﬀs are used for
political or redistributive purposes and particularly with the interests of producers.26 Such
considerations could be incorporated in the model of the present paper by using the national
welfare function for government objectives but putting a heavier weight on producers proﬁts
in the or by incorporating a term to reﬂect political contributions into the function. It
seems possible that producer interests that span regions, as between the UK and the US for
example, could counteract the forces towards regionalism identiﬁed in the basic framework.
Another interesting line of research is to investigate how variation in the assumptions
over the ﬂow of information and expectations between countries through the agreement
formation process changes the outcome. It appears that perfect information and perfect
foresight facilitate an immediate move to free trade. But it would be interesting to ask in
which ways weakening information ﬂows in various ways would vary the outcome away from
26

See for example Grossman and Helpman (1995), Krishna (1998), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and
Ornelas (2005).
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free trade, and under what alternative assumptions about information ﬂows and expectations
regional trade block formation would be the result.
The assumption of naive best responses gives a convenient and tractable way to deﬁne
payoﬀs under the TA formation game. Naive best responses are also believed to capture the
process by which agents learn about their environment when they do not have full information
about, or cannot communicate perfectly with, the actions of all of the other players (see Bala
and Goyal 2000). Such an assumption seems reasonable in the present international policy
making environment where policy makers are not able to perfectly observe each others’
actions. An alternative approach would be to assume that countries are far sighted. Page,
Wooders and Kamat (2004) provide a basic general framework which could be used to
incorporate farsightedness into the present model.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Demand functions by region and agreement membership
Based on (2.6), the basic expressions for equilibrium output produced by country j for
country i can be written as follows. The output functions (2.9)-(2.12) are obtained by
substituting optimal tariﬀs t∗ir (bir , binr ) and t∗inr (bir , binr ) into the following functions:
(e − c) + 3d + (3 − bir ) tir + (3 − binr ) tinr
;
7

xirm =

(e − c) − 4d + (3 − bir ) tir + (3 − binr ) tinr
;
7
(e − c) + 3d − (4 + bir ) tir + (3 − binr ) tinr
;
xirnm =
7
(e − c) − 4d + (3 − bir ) tir − (4 + binr ) tinr
.
xinrnm =
7
xinrm =

A.2. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.

For country i, where i ∈ Bk and i ∈ Rl , maximize i∈Bk wi , given by (2.8), with respect

to tir and tinr . Use Ci = Xi2 /2, Ti = j∈N tij xij and the fact that π ij = x2ij . Since country
i’s tariﬀs do not aﬀect consumption or production decisions in other countries, we may write
country i’s its tariﬀ problem as
Max

{tij }i∈B

wi +

/ k
k ,j ∈B


j∈Bk \{i}



1
π ij = (e − c) Xi − Xi2 −
x2ij − d
xij .
2
j ∈B
/ k

j∈
/ Rl

The ﬁrst order condition with respect to tir is
dXi
dxirnm
dxinrnm
− 2 (3 − bir ) xirnm
− 2 (3 − binr )
dtir
dtir
dtir
dxinrnm
dxinrm
− binr
+ (3 − binr )
d = 0.
dtir
dtir

(e − c − 1)

The ﬁrst order condition with respect to tinr is
dXi
dxirnm
dxinrnm
− 2 (3 − bir ) xirnm
− 2 (3 − binr )
dtinr
dtinr
dtinr
dxinrm
dxinrnm
− binr
+ (3 − binr )
d = 0.
dtinr
dtinr

(e − c − 1)
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Then diﬀerentiate the expressions for xirm , xirnm , xinrm and xinrnm in Appenix A1 and
substitute to obtain a reduced form for each ﬁrst order condition. Since the objective function
is globally concave in tir and in tinr , there exists a unique symmetric solution for each:

(e − c) (1 + bir + binr ) + (24 + 6bir − 8binr ) d + (3 − binr ) (15 + 2 (bir + binr )) tinr
;
2 + 2b2ir + bir (9 + 2binr ) + 3 (17 − 2binr )
(e − c) (1 + bir + binr ) − (25 − 6bir + 8binr ) d + (3 − binr ) (15 + 2 (bir + binr )) tir
.
=
2 + 2b2inr + binr (9 + 2bir ) + 3 (17 − 2bir )

t∗ir =
t∗inr

Solving simultaneously for t∗ir and t∗inr obtains the result. 
Proof of Lemma 1. That fact that xirm (bir , binr ) > xinrm (bir , binr ) > xirnm (bir , binr ) >
xinrnm (bir , binr ) is established by inspection of (2.9)-(2.12). It remains to show that if
d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22) then xinrnm (bir , binr ) > 0. Since xinrnm (bir , binr ), as given by (2.12), is decreasing d, we can solve for the largest value of d at which xinrnm (bir , binr ) = 0 (bir ∈ {1, 2, 3},
binr ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and bir + binr ≤ 5; recall that there are no non-regional non-members for
bir = 3, binr = 3.) The solution for the value of d at which xinrnm (bir , binr ) = 0, denoted by
d, is
d=

2 (e − c)
.
5 + 3bir + 2bir binr + 2b2ir

The solution d is globally decreasing in bir and binr , so use bir = 3, binr = 2 in the solution to
yield d = (e − c) /22. It can be checked by substitution that xinrnm (bir , binr ) > 0 for bir = 2,
binr = 3. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2. It must be established that dxirnm /dbir < 0, dxinrnm /dbir < 0,
dxirnm /dbinr < 0, and dxinrnm /dbinr < 0. Each case will be taken in turn. Diﬀerentiating
xirnm (bir , binr ) with respect to bir , we obtainDiﬀerentiating xinrnm (bir , binr ) with respect to
bir , we obtain
dxirnm (bir , binr )
2binr d
=
dbir
2Δ (bir , binr )
(6 + 8 (bir + binr )) (2 (e − c) + (3 + binr (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d)
−
(2Δ (bir , binr ))2
=−

2 (3 + 4 (bir + binr )) (e − c) + (9 + 12bir + binr (1 + 2 (bir + binr )) (5 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d
.
2 (Δ (bir , binr ))2

So dxirnm (bir , binr ) /dbir < 0 for all d ≥ 0.
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Diﬀerentiating xinrnm (bir , binr ) with respect to bir , we obtain
dxinrnm (bir , binr )
(3 + 4bir + 2binr ) d
= −
dbir
2Δ (bir , binr )
(6 + 8 (bir + binr )) (2 (e − c) − (5 + bir (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d)
−
(2Δ (bir , binr ))2

=−

2 (3 + 4 (bir + binr )) (e − c) + (9 + 12bir + binr (1 + 2 (bir + binr )) (5 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d
.
2 (Δ (bir , binr ))2

So dxinrnm (bir , binr ) /dbir < 0 for all d ≥ 0. (After simpliﬁcation, we see that dxirnm (bir , binr ) /dbir =
dxinrnm (bir , binr ) /dbir .)
Diﬀerentiating xinrnm (bir , binr ) with respect to binr , we obtain
dxirnm (bir , binr )
(3 + 2bir + 4binr ) d
=
dbinr
2Δ (bir , binr )
(6 + 8 (bir + binr )) (2 (e − c) + (3 + binr (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d)
−
(2Δ (bir , binr ))2
=

−2 (3 + 4 (bir + binr )) (e − c) + (15 + 13bir + 4 (5binr + bir binr (3 + binr ) + (3 + 2binr ) b2ir + b3ir )) d
.
2 (Δ (bir , binr ))2

The second term in the numerator is positive and increasing in bir , binr and d while the
ﬁrst term is negative. It is easily checked that overall the numerator is negative for bir = 3,
binr = 2 and d = (e − c) /22. So dxirnm (bir , binr ) /dbinr < 0 for all feasible {bir , binr } pairs
and d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22).
Diﬀerentiating xinrnm (bir , binr ) with respect to binr , we obtain
dxinrnm (bir , binr )
2binr d
= −
dbinr
2Δ (bir , binr )
(6 + 8 (bir + binr )) (2 (e − c) − (5 + bir (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d)
−
(2Δ (bir , binr ))2
=

−2 (3 + 4 (bir + binr )) (e − c) + (15 + 13bir + 4 (5binr + bir binr (3 + binr ) + (3 + 2binr ) b2ir + b3ir )) d
.
2 (Δ (bir , binr ))2

After simpliﬁcation, we see that dxinrnm (bir , binr ) /dbinr = dxirnm (bir , binr ) /dbinr So it must
be the case that dxinrnm (bir , binr ) /dbinr < 0 for all feasible {bir , binr } pairs and d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22).
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Proposition 3. The expansion or formation of a TA increases the aggregate welfare of
member countries.
Proof of Proposition 3. The strategy of proof follows Yi (1996). Assume that there
exists a TA structure B = (B1 , B2 , ..., Bm ) and that two or more TAs B1 , B2 ... Br merge to
create an enlarged TA. We will show that the total welfare of the members of the enlarged
TA increases. To do this, we will show that the tariﬀ changes required to implement TA
enlargement undertaken by any one given member of the enlarged TA must increase the
aggregate welfare of all members. Thinking of TA enlargement as a sequence of such tariﬀ
changes by each and every member then gives the result.
Claim. Initially, before the merger, country i has free trade with bir − 1 countries in
its own region and binr countries in the other region. Country i levies a tariﬀ tir (bir , binr )
on each of the 3 − bir non-members in its own region and a tariﬀ tinr (bir , binr ) on each of
the 3 − binr countries in the other region. As a result of the merger, in the new enlarged
TA, country i shares a TA with bir − 1 countries in its own region and binr countries in the
other region. Let sir = bir − bir ≥ 0 and sinr = binr − binr ≥ 0. Country i abolishes tariﬀs
on sir countries in its own region and sinr countries in the other region, and changes tariﬀs
to tir (bir , binr ) on each of the 3 − bir non-members in its own region and changes tariﬀs to
tinr (bir , binr ) on each of the 3 − binr non-members in the other region. Then the aggregate
welfare of the bir + sir + binr + sinr countries in the enlarged TA (which consists of country
i, bir + binr − 1 countries who paid no tariﬀs initially and sir + sinr countries whose tariﬀs
were abolished) improves.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the TA B1 , of which Country 1 is assumed to
be a member. B1 has b1r members from R1 and b1nr members from R2 . Then let membership
expand to create an enlarged TA, B1 , consisting of b1r members in R1 and b1nr members
in R2 (where all original members are also members of the enlarged TA). The comparative
statics exercise that we will now carry out is as follows. We will calculate the eﬀect on the
aggregate welfare of all countries in B1 that results when Country 1 abolishes tariﬀs on s1r
countries in R1 and s1nr countries in R2 , and changes tariﬀs on (3 − b1r − s1r ) non-members
in R1 from t1r (b1r , b1nr ) to t1r (b1r , b1nr ) and on (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) non-members in R2 from
t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) to t1nr (b1r , b1nr ).
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Deﬁne
Δt1r = t1r (b1r , b1nr ) − t1r (b1r , b1nr ) ;
Δt1nr = t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) − t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) .
First consider inﬁnitesimal changes in tariﬀs
dt ≡ (0, ..., 0, dt, ..., dt, dtr , ..., dtr , 0, ..., 0, φdt, ..., φdt, dtnr , ..., dtnr )
from a tariﬀ vector
t ≡ (0, ..., 0, t, ..., t, tr , ..., tr , 0, ..., 0, φt, ..., φt, tnr , ..., tnr ) ,
where: dt appears from the (b1r + 1)th element to the (b1r + s1r )th element and from the
(b1nr + 4)th element to the (b1nr + s1nr + 4)th element, unless b1nr = s1nr = 0 in which case
dtnr appears from the 4th to the last elements; dtr appears from the (b1r + s1r + 1)th element
to the 3rd element; dtnr appears from the (b1nr + s1nr + 4)th element to the last element.
The tariﬀ t is imposed on new TA members in the same region and is reduced to zero through
the TA formation process. The tariﬀ φt (i.e. φ × t) is imposed on new TA members from
the other region, where φ = t1nr /t1r (see below for speciﬁcation of t1nr and t1r ). Also,
Δt1r
dt;
t1r (b1r , b1nr )
Δt1nr
φdt.
≡
t1nr (b1r , b1nr )

dtr ≡
dtnr
Start from

t (b1r , b1nr ) ≡ (0, ..., 0, t1r (b1r , b1nr ) , ..., t1r (b1r , b1nr ) , 0, ..., 0, t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) , ..., t1nr (b1r , b1nr ))
where 0 appears from the ﬁrst to the (b1r + s1r )th element and from the fourth to the
(b1nr + s1nr + 4)th element (unless b1nr = s1nr = 0). We can move to
t (b1r , b1nr ) ≡ (0, ..., 0, t1r (b1r , b1nr ) , ..., t1r (b1r , b1nr ) , 0, ..., 0, t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) , ..., t1nr (b1r , b1nr ))
where 0 appears from the ﬁrst to the (b1r )th element and from the fourth to the (b1nr + 4)th
element by integrating the inﬁnitesimal changes dt from 0 to t (b1r , b1nr ). Below, we will


show that d
j∈B  wj /dt < 0 for all t along such a path of integration. The claim then
1

follows.
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Since changes in Country 1’s tariﬀs do not aﬀect sales in other countries,
⎞
⎛
⎞
⎛


wj ⎠ /dt =d ⎝ŵ1 +
π 1j ⎠ /dt,
d⎝
j∈B1

j∈B1 \{1}

where ŵ1 is Country 1’s welfare net of its exports. Since


ŵ1 +

π 1j = v (X1 ) − cX1 − d

j∈N \{1}



x1j ,

j∈R2

it follows that
ŵ1 +



π 1j = v (X1 ) − cX1 −

j∈B1 \{1}



π 1j − d

j∈N \B1



x1j .

j∈R2

The proportional relationship between t1r (b1r , b1nr ) and t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) is given by
φ =

t1nr (b1r , b1nr )
t1r (b1r , b1nr )

= 1−

2 (4 + 5b1nr + 2 (b1nr − 1) b1r + 2b21r ) d
.
(1 + 2 (b1r + b1nr )) (e − c) + (3 + b1r (2 (b1r + b1nr ) − 1)) d

Note that φ = 1 for d = 0 and 0 < φ < 1 for d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22). The total tariﬀ at the tariﬀ
vector t is
T1 =



t1j = (s1r + φs1nr ) t + (3 − b1r − s1r ) tr + (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) tnr .

j∈N

The change in the total tariﬀ is calculated from dt as follows:
dT1 = (s1r + φs1nr ) dt + (3 − b1r − s1r ) dtr + (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) dtnr
s1r t1r (b1r , b1nr ) + s1nr t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) + (3 − b1r − s1r ) Δt1r + (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) Δt1nr
dt.
=
t1r (b1r , b1nr )
The following notation will also be helpful:
ΔT1 = s1r t1r (b1r , b1nr ) + s1nr t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) + (3 − b1r − s1r ) Δt1r + (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) Δt1nr .
From (2.4) and the ﬁrst-order-condition of (2.5), we have pi − c = xij + tij + dij . Therefore,


j∈N (pi − c) = Xi + Ti + Di , where Di =
j∈N dij = 3d.
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From (2.6), dxij =

dTi −7dtij
.
7

Therefore we have:

dx11
ΔT1
=
;
dt
7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
dx1b1r +1
ΔT1 − 7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
=
;
dt
7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
ΔT1 − 7Δt1r
dx1b1r +s1r +1
=
;
dt
7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
dx1b1nr +4
ΔT1 − 7t1nr (b1r , b1nr )
=
;
dt
7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
dx1b1nr +s1nr +4
ΔT1 − 7Δt1nr
=
.
dt
7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
Using these results,
⎛
⎞





d ⎝
d
d
d
ŵ1 +
(v (X1 ) − cX1 ) −
π 1j ⎠ =
x21j − d
x1j
dt
dt
dt
dt j∈R


j∈B1 \{1}

=



j∈N \B1

(p1 − c)

j∈N

dx1j
−
dt



2

 dx1j
dx1j
2x1j
−d
dt
dt

j∈R

j∈N \B1

2

1

{s1r t1r (b1r , b1nr ) Ξ1 + s1nr t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) Φ1
7t1r (b1r , b1nr )
+ (3 − b1r − s1r ) Δt1r Ψ1 + (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) Δt1nr Ω1 } ,
=

where:
Ξ1 = (X1 + T1 ) − 7 (x1b1r +1 + t)
−2 (3 − b1r − s1r ) x1b1r +s1r +1 − 2 (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) x1b1nr +s1nr +4 ;
Φ1 = (X1 + T1 ) − 7 (x1b1nr +4 + φt)
−2 (3 − b1r − s1r ) x1b1r +s1r +1 − 2 (3 − b1nr − s1nr ) x1b1nr +s1nr +4 ;
Ψ1 = (X1 + T1 ) − 7 (x1b1r +s1r +1 + tr ) + 2 (4 + b1r + s1r ) x1b1r +s1r +1 ;
Ω1 = (X1 + T1 ) − 7 (x1b1nr +s1nr +4 + tnr ) + 2 (4 + b1nr + s1nr ) x1b1nr +s1nr +4 .


d
The proof that dt
ŵ1 + j∈B \{1} π ij < 0 proceeds in two steps. First we show that,
1


d


at t (b1r , b1nr ), it is the case that dt
ŵ1 + j∈B \{1} π ij < 0. Second, we show that
1


d2
ŵ1 + j∈B \{1} π ij < 0.
dt2
1

Step 1. At t (b1r , b1nr ), the optimal tariﬀs t1r (b1r , b1nr ) and t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) are chosen
to satisfy Ψ1 = 0 and Ω1 = 0 respectively. (Note that Ψ1 and Ω1 are the derivatives of
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ŵ1 +



j∈B1 \{1}

π ij with respect to t1r and t1nr respectively; t1r (b1r , b1nr ) and t1nr (b1r , b1nr )

are the optimal tariﬀs of the size b1r + b1nr TA on 3 − b1r regional non-members and 3 − b1nr
non-regional non-members respectively, given free trade among the b1r + b1nr members.) It
remains to show that, at t (b1r , b1nr ), the terms Ξ1 and Φ1 are both strictly negative. (Of
course, due to oligopoly distortions, Ξ1 and Φ1 could only be zero if trade subsidies were
allowed).
At t (b1r , b1nr ), x11 =, ..., = x1b1r +s1r , x14 =, ..., x1b1nr +s1nr +3 (unless b1nr = s1nr = 0, in
which case x14 =, ..., x1b1nr +s1nr +4 ), and t = 0. Also,
X1 = b1r x11 + (3 − b1r ) x1b1r +s1r +1 + b1nr x1b1nr +s1nr +3 + (3 − b1nr ) x1b1nr +s1nr +4 ;
T1 = (3 − b1r ) t1r (b1r , b1nr ) + (3 − b1nr ) t1nr (b1r , b1nr ) .
Then we have
Ξ1 = −4x11 + b1nr x1b1nr +s1nr +3
− (3 − b1r ) (x11 + x1b1r +s1r +1 − t1r (b1r , b1nr ))
− (3 − b1nr ) (x1b1nr +s1nr +4 − t1nr (b1r , b1nr )) .
Now, observing that x11 = x1rm , x1b1r +s1r +1 = x1rnm , x1b1nr +s1nr +3 = x1nrm and x1b1nr +s1nr +4 =
x1nrnm , we can use (2.9)-(2.12) to substitute for x11 , x1b1r +s1r +1 , x1b1nr +s1nr +3 and x1b1nr +s1nr +4 ,
which obtains
Ξ1 = −

7 (2 (e − c) + (3 + binr (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d)
< 0.
10 + bir (5 + 2bir ) + binr (4 + bir ) + b2inr

Next observe that, after simpliﬁcation,
Φ1 = −4x1b1r +s1r +3 + b1r x11
− (3 − b1nr ) (x1b1r +s1r +3 + x1b1nr +s1nr +4 − t1nr (b1r , b1nr ))
− (3 − b1r ) (x1b1r +s1r +1 − t1r (b1r , b1nr )) .
Adopting the same basic approach used to simplify Ξ1 , we then have
Φ1 = −

7 (2 (e − c) − (5 + binr (3 + 2 (bir + binr ))) d)
10 + bir (5 + 2bir ) + binr (4 + bir ) + b2inr

We can see straight away that for d = 0 it is the case that Φ1 < 0, and that Φ1 is increasing
in d. We then ﬁnd by subsitution that for d = (e − c) /22, bir = 3 and binr = 2, it is the case
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that Φ1 = 0. It follows immediately that Φ1 < 0 for all b1r ∈ {1, 2, 3} and b1nr ∈ {0, 1, 2}
and d ∈ [0, (e − c) /22).
Step 2. We can write the second order condition directly as
⎛
⎞

2

1
d ⎝


 2
⎠
Δt21r
π ij
ŵ1 +
=
2 − (3 − b1r ) 35 + 15b1r + 2 (b1r )
2
dt
(7t1r )
j∈B  \{1}
1

+ (3 − b1r ) (15 + 4b1r + 2b1nr ) (s1r t1r + s1nr t1nr ) Δt1r

2
− (3 − b1nr ) −14 + 15b1nr + 2 (b1nr ) Δt21nr
+ (3 − b1nr ) (15 + 4b1nr + 2b1r ) (s1r t1r + s1nr t1nr ) Δt1nr
−2 (3 − b1r − b1nr ) (s1r t1r + s1nr t1nr )

2

− (3 − b1nr ) 7 + 8b1r − 2b1nr (3 − b1r ) + 2 (b1r )

2


Δt1r Δt1nr .

Using the functions for tir (bir , binr ), tir (bir , binr ), tinr (bir , binr ) and tinr (bir , binr ), substitution
reveals that the second order condition is negative for all feasible values b1r ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
b1nr ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, given d ∈ [0, (e − c) /22).
Proof of Proposition 5. Without loss of generality, take Country 1 as an example. (The
cases for all other countries are analogous.) Write down two welfare functions for Country 1:
w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} and w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}}. The ﬁrst measures the welfare of Country
1 when it is in a regional TA and all countries in the other region are in a second regional TA.
The second welfare function measures welfare when Country 1 joins a TA with the countries
in the other region while Countries 2 and 3 form a TA. To calculate w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}},
note that Country 1 sets a tariﬀ t∗inr (3, 0) on all imports from the other region, and Country
1’s exports also face t∗inr (3, 0) from all countries in the other region. Trade within regions is
free. Using these tariﬀs in (2.9) and (2.12), and substituting the resulting expressions into
(2.7), we obtain

3 387 (e − c)2 − 134 (e − c) d + 1072d2
w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} =
2450
For w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}}, Country 1 sets t∗ir (1, 3) on imports from non-members in its own
region. Country 1’s exports face tariﬀs t∗ir (2, 0) from non-members in its own region. Trade
between Country 1 and the countries in the other region is free. Substituting for tariﬀs in
(2.9), (2.11) and (2.10), and substituting the resulting expressions into (2.7), we obtain

3 26442 (e − c)2 − 44336 (e − c) d + 92225d2
w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}} =
.
163592
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We can now see that
w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}} > w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} for d = 0;
w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}} < w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} for d = (e − c) /22.
We can also see that both w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} and w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}} are decreasing
in d for d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22) but w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}} is decreasing more rapidly. So we
can ﬁnd a unique value of d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22), called d , at which w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} =
w1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}};

√

3
7225156
−
385
338226178)
d =
(e − c)
25290313

0.017 (e − c)


Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 2, member welfare of a given TA is decreasing in
the size of each of the other TAs that exist. Therefore, the highest feasible level of welfare is
achieved when a country is a member of a TA and all non-members of its TA are singletons.
It remains to establish the TA structure that maximizes member welfare (given that all
non-members are singletons). The result is seen clearly if we take each case in turn, starting
with the smallest possible TA and increasing size. First, it follows from Proposition 3 that if
two singletons form a two-member TA this must increase member welfare. We now establish
that if both members are in the same region this yields a higher level of welfare than if each
member is in a diﬀerent region. Without loss of generality, assume that Country 1 forms a
2-country TA either with Country 2 in its own region or with Country 4 in the other region.
Welfare is w1 {{1, 2} , {3} , {4} , {5} , {6}} or w1 {{1, 4} , {2} , {4} , {5} , {6}} respectively. To
calculate w1 {{1, 2} , {3} , {4} , {5} , {6}}, note that Country 1 levies a tariﬀ t∗ir (2, 0) and
t∗inr (2, 0) on imports from regional and non-regional non-members respectively. The nonmember from R1 levies a tariﬀ t∗ir (1, 0) on imports from Country 1, and non-members from
R2 levy a tariﬀ t∗inr (1, 0) on imports from Country 1. Substituting these tariﬀs into (2.9)(2.12) and substituting appropriately into (2.7) yields
w1 {{1, 2} , {3} , {4} , {5} , {6}} =

889 (e − c)2 − 999 (e − c) d + 2205d2
.
1859

To calculate w1 {{1, 4} , {2} , {4} , {5} , {6}}, note that Country 1 levies a tariﬀ t∗ir (1, 1) and
t∗inr (1, 1) on imports from regional and non-regional non-members respectively. The nonmembers from R1 levy t∗ir (1, 0) on imports from Country 1, and non-members from R2
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levy t∗inr (1, 0) on imports from Country 1. Substituting these tariﬀs into (2.9)-(2.12) and
substituting appropriately into (2.7) yields
7112 (e − c)2 − 4404 (e − c) d + 16431d2
.
w1 {{1, 4} , {2} , {4} , {5} , {6}} =
14872
Welfare under the two TA conﬁgurations is equal for d = 0 and the latter yields a lower level
of welfare for d > 0, with the diﬀerence increasing in the size of d.
The same basic approach can be used to establish that the 3-member TA that maximizes
a member’s welfare is where all members are in the same region, and that a 3-member regional
TA yields a higher level of per-member welfare than a 2-member regional TA:
w1 ({1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5} , {6}) =

5787 (e − c)2 − 3114 (e − c) d + 13362d2
.
11830

We can also calculate the level of welfare of Country 1 if a non-regional member is included;
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5} , {6}}. In that case, Country 1 imposes a tariﬀ t∗inr (3, 1) on imports from
non-member, and non-members impose a tariﬀ t∗inr (1, 0) on imports from Country 1. Substituting these tariﬀs into (2.9), (2.10) and (2.12), and making the appropriate substitution
into (2.7), we have
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5} , {6}} =

333 (e − c)2 − 262 (e − c) d + 915d2
.
676

We can now see that
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5} , {6}} > w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5} , {6}} for d = 0
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5} , {6}} < w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5} , {6}} for d = (e − c) /22.
We can also see that w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}} is declining in d for d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22). So we
can ﬁnd a unique value of d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22), called d , at which w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} =
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}};

√
1471 − 2 433615
(e − c)
d =
5301


0.029 (e − c) .

Finally, we must check that a 5-member TA does not yield a higher level of welfare than
either a 4-member TA or a 3-member TA. As for all previous cases, a member obtains a
higher payoﬀ if all countries in its own region are members of the TA. Thus
12145 (e − c)2 − 11262 (e − c) d + 37450d2
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , {6}} =
.
24674
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Since w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}} > w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , {6}} for d = 0, and since w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , {6}}
has a steeper negative slope in d than w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}}, it follows that w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}} >
w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , {6}} for all d ∈ [0, (e − c) /22]. Similar calculations show that free trade
yields a lower level of per-member welfare than w1 {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}} and w1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}}.
Proof of Proposition 7. There are two cases to consider; d ∈ (0, d) and d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22).
Take d ∈ (0, d ) ﬁrst. Given that all countries are singletons in the previous period, by Proposition 5, each country i writes down a strategy si listing itself, the two other countries in its
region, and one country from the other region. Thus, each country in R1 names every other
country in R1 in its strategy plus one country from R2 . Symmetrically, again by Proposition
5, each country in R2 names every other country in R2 in its strategy plus one country from
R1 . But no country in R1 names every country in R2 and no country in R2 names every
country in R1 . Therefore, the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R1 is R1 itself. So we have a regional TA, B1 = R1 . Symmetrically, the intersecting
set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R2 is R2 itself. So we have a second
regional TA, B2 = R2 .
Now take d ∈ (d , (e − c) /22). The outcome is the same (but easier to establish). Given
that all countries are singletons in the previous period, by Proposition 5, each country i writes
down a strategy si listing itself and the two other countries in its region. Thus, each country
in R1 names every other country in R1 in its strategy. Symmetrically, again by Proposition
5, each country in R2 names every other country in R2 in its strategy. Therefore, the
intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R1 is R1 itself. So we
have a regional TA, B1 = R1 . Symmetrically, the intersecting set of countries formed by the
strategies of countries in R2 is R2 itself. So we have a second regional TA, B2 = R2 .
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 4, aggregate member welfare increases when a
TA expands from 3 members to 6 members (free trade). The two regional TAs, B1 = R1
and B2 = R2 are symmetrical, so each country has the same welfare. Thus, the welfare of
every country must be increased by the merging of the two TAs to the grand 6 member
coalition. Moreover, no country can gain by deviation because a veto of the grand coalition
must result in a return to the TA structure of B1 = R1 and B2 = R2 . 
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